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Beyond the well-publicised abandonment of Daewoo's gigantic agricultural project, large-
scale appropriations continue in Madagascar. Based on case studies, this paper analyses how 
land deals are partly shaped by the competition for control over land access. The Malagasy 
legal framework does have the potential to regulate large-scale land acquisitions and protect 
local land rights protection. But, all these positive-laws are not enforced due to investors’ 
strategies to access to land and competition among state and non-state institutions for control 
over land resources. To gain access, most investors both engage in formal procedures and 
establish informal land agreements but they only negotiate with what, for them, are the “most 
visible” institutions, i.e. positive law institutions. Hence, neither of these two routes ensures 
tenure security. In view of the material and symbolic resources at stake, state officials 
generally help them to access land. However, the different state institutions find themselves 
competing over land control to assert greater authority. These power struggles generally 
hinder the land deals and take precedence over the respect of the pro-smallholder provisions 
of the recent land reform. As a consequence, some local landholders resort to violence to 
defend their rights while the access to land for investors is far from being guaranteed. 
Key-words: bundle of powers, conflict, land reform, large-scale land acquisitions, 
Madagascar   
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the main issues raised by large-scale land investments in southern countries concerns 
resource access and land-use competition, particularly in contexts where local communities’ 
land rights are not legally recognized and most of the country’s land is considered as state-
owned (Cotula et al., 2009; Gorgen et al., 2009; Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009; World 
Bank, 2010). Large-scale land transfers (lease or purchase) risk ignoring and breaching local 
land access practices and, hence, access to a major source of livelihood. 
In Madagascar, beyond the well publicised abandonment of Daewoo's huge agricultural 
project (targeting 1.3 million hectares of land) large-scale appropriations continue 
(Andrianirina Ratsialonana, 2011). But, unlike in most other southern countries, a pro-
smallholder land reform is ongoing (Teyssier et al., 2010). Since 2005, profound legal 
changes have recently been implemented in matters of local land rights protection. The 2005 
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land reform1 challenges the state-ownership of a large part of the country’s land, legally 
recognizes individual and collective local land rights and gives land management 
responsibilities to local government (Teyssier et al., 2009).  
Analysing the respect of local land rights requires examining of how investors access land and 
what institutions have control over land access. States play a major role in the establishment 
of these land deals, notably by authorising land access in exchange for direct or potential 
economic advantages (Cotula et al., 2009, World Bank, 2010). But the state is not the only 
institution claiming control over land, and besides, it is far from being a congruent and 
homogeneous institution. Moreover, in Madagascar, land access is both based on local 
practices, rules, conventions and on positive laws and, as such, controlled by various state and 
non-state institutions (Evers, 2002; Le Roy et al., 2006; Aubert et al., 2008, Omrane, 2008; 
Muttenzerg, 2010).  
As is the case in every context of normative and institutional pluralism, social actors and 
politico-legal institutions (state or other) compete over the access to land resources and over 
the control of this access (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). Confrontation takes place on two levels 
(Lund, 2002; Le Meur, 2006): (i) between individuals and groups competing over use and 
property rights on land and (ii) between power-holders battling to assert the legitimacy of 
their control over land, and thus their capacity to define and enforce the rules of the game. As 
a result, in order to analyse large-scale acquisition, one cannot just analyse the ‘bundle of 
rights’ on land but must also take into account 'the bundle of powers' relative to control over 
land (Ribot and Peluso, 2003; Borras and Franco, 2010).  
Our paper therefore addresses the following questions: in the Malagasy context, do investors’ 
attempts to obtain large areas of land hinder the enforcement of the land laws and encourage 
rent-seeking strategies by state and non-state actors? Does competition for authority - among 
politico-legal institutions and within the state - ease or hinder investors’ land access? In this 
competition for authority, are there institutions that still legitimize and defend the interests of 
local landholders? And lastly, do local landholders – in their diversity - also have some form 
of authority over land control?  
                                                 
1
 Formalised in law 2005-019 of 17th October 2005, determining the principles governing the status of lands and 




This article is based on information relative to 17 agribusiness projects and extended case 
studies on 6 projects (see Table 1). It draws on ethnographic material (about two hundred in-
depth and repeated interviews with employees from public institutions, regional or local 
governments and traditional authorities, private developers, local land users, and other key 
informants). The interviews were conducted between March 2010 and September 2011 by the 
authors of this paper in the framework of the Malagasy Land Observatory activities.  
[Table 1] 
The article opens with a presentation of the legal framework that enables state institutions to 
control land access and to regulate large land deals. In the following section, it deciphers the 
process by which investors attempt to gain access in contexts of overlapping land rights. It 
then analyses how and why the central, regional and local governments seek to ease investors’ 
efforts at obtaining land use rights. It also looks at how their competition to control land 
access contributes to slowing down the legalisation of investors’ land claims. In the final 
section, it exposes how local landholders attempt to defend their land access. In the 
conclusion, it discusses the role of law –in particular the ongoing land reform - authorities and 
civil society relative to land management and to the protection of local land rights.  
 
II SITUATION OF LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM 
In Madagascar, investment projects and land access are governed by a number of different 
laws and institutions.  
To promote investment and ease land access in agricultural and mining sector, the 
Ravalomanana regime (2002-2009) created a “one-stop office” for investors in 2006 (the 
Economic Development Board of Madagascar, EDBM). It also enacted an investment law in 
2008 giving competences to the EDBM to deliver “authorizations of land acquisition” for 
foreigners2. For agricultural investment in particular, the Ministry of Agriculture encouraged 
the regional governments to create “Agricultural Investment Areas” (AIA) to enhance country 
planning and reduce the red tape for investors3. In line with environmental decree4, all 
agricultural investments exceeding an area of 1 000 hectares has also to get an environmental 
                                                 
2
 Law n° 2007-036 of 14th January 2008. 
3
 Although some of these zones are identified they are not legally formalized.  
4
  Decree to Make Investments Compatible with the Environment (Decree MECIE, No 99-954 of December 15, 
1999, modified by Decree No 2004-167). 
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permit, delivered by the National Office for Environment provided that negative impacts are 
minimized, notably on land uses issues.  
Besides these laws for investors, the Ravalomanana regime, with the support of various 
international development agencies, launched a new land reform that is still in effect today 
(e.g. Teyssier et al., 2009). Passed in 2005 and 2006, these new land laws established that land 
that was untitled but occupied was  no longer the property of the state but were ‘untitled 
private property’ (UPP). Thus, on occupied land the “presumption of state property” was 
replaced by a presumption of private property. Moreover, this change was accompanied by a 
decentralisation of land competences. Local governments (municipalities), provided they have 
a local land registry office, can legally recognize local/customary property rights (on UPP) 
and issue individual or collective land certificates. Thus, two state authorities can manage 
land issues and validate legal property: the state land services by delivering land titles, and the 
local governments by issuing land certificates5.  
Consequently, the state, through the state land services, can only lease or sell state-owned land 
to investors. State-owned land has been drastically reduced. It now amounts to: a) land titled 
in the name of the state and b) un-titled and unoccupied land. The state can neither lease nor 
sell land that includes or encroaches upon titled private property or upon occupied land 
(UPP), whether or not formalized by a certificate.  
All these new laws or bills (investment law, land laws, IAA, environmental decree) do 
provide a regulatory framework for large-scale land acquisitions and for local land rights 
protection. They also enable multiply the number of state institutions that can claim control 
over land access. (EDBM, the Ministry of Agriculture and the regional government, the 
central state through the land services, the municipality through the local land office). . 
However, these powers to grant land access rights are not clearly delineated between these 
various authorities. While making procedures confusing, these laws therefore provide 
investors with multiple institutional ways to negotiate land access and they open the way for 
potential struggle for authority among state institutions (Ballet et al. 2011). 
It goes without saying that these laws do not operate in a vacuum but, to paraphrase Griffiths 
(1992), in a social field that is governed by laws, rules and convention of different origin and 
                                                 
5
 Land right holders can choose the means of formalising their rights: title deed or certificate; both conferring 
similar legal property rights but the second being 50 times less expensive -10 USD instead of 507 USD- and 6 
times quicker to obtain –-on average 12 months instead of 6 years (ECR  2008; Malagasy Land Observatory, 
2011). In October 2011, 400 Malagasy municipalities, or one-fourth of the total number, had set up land registry 
offices. These have delivered approximately 60,000 certificates in about four years, while, over the same period, 
the State land services have delivered an average of 1,500 land titles per year (www.observatoire-foncier.mg). 
6 
 
that generates its own rule of the game. In addition to these state authorities, different 
local/customary institutions operate at local level to legitimise, even formalise, different 
bundles of rights (descendants of royal families, elders, village chiefs, who sometimes 
formalise some local land rights through written documents called “little documents”). They 
can also claim control over land access (whether on state or non-state legal grounds) and 
impact on investors' land claims.   
Moreover, none of these positive-laws are self-implementing, as was made clear by the 
Daewoo case. Indeed, first negotiations with Daewoo totally left aside the presumption of 
private property and were about to illegally transfer land to the Korean enterprise on already 
occupied land (Rochegude, 2011). The objective of the following sections is to analyse the 
“social working of rules” (Griffiths, 1992) in the three processes of gaining, controlling and 
maintaining land access.  
 
III ROUTES FOR GAINING ACCESS TO LAND  
INTEREST IN LAND REMAINS  
 Between 2005 and 2010, approximately 50 agribusiness projects covering surfaces above 1000 
1000 hectares were listed as starting or ongoing (Andrianirina Ratsialonana et al., 2011). An 
aggregate total of nearly 3,000,000 ha of land were targeted (the equivalent of the actual 
agricultural area cultivated by the 2.5 million family farms) (Figure 1). Following the well-
publicised abandonment of Daewoo's huge agricultural project, two-thirds of these investments 
investments did not materialize mostly because of the world financial crisis (e.g. World Bank, 
2010) and of the February 2009 coup d’Etat which opened the still ongoing national political crisis 







Figure 2Figure 1). Although some food projects are starting (maïs, peanut), biofuel based on 
cane and above all jatropha, for domestic and international markets, is still the main objective 
(Andrianirina Ratsialonana et al., 2011; WWF-PNUD-PAD, 2012). Contrary to what is being 
                                                 
6
 See Randrianja (dir.), (2012).  
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seen in many developing country, these investors are not large international companies or 
sovereign funds or new land grabbers coming from Asia7 but mostly medium European or 
small private companies. They are almost exclusively foreigners, with little experience of the 
agricultural sector and, often, with no experience in Madagascar. Although the seed money is 
limited, they are mainly funded or they hope to be funded by foreign investment—for the 
most part from European origins. They plan to develop large-scale plantations (from 5 000 to 
100 000 ha) based on mechanisation and on a wage system. Considering the land as state-
owned land, most of them hope to get a 50-year or a 99-year lease (emphyteutuc lease) from 
the state).   
 








FORMAL AND INFORMAL ROUTES TO NEGOTIATE LAND ACCESS  
The investors’ processes of gaining access to land partly show the distance that exists between 
law and practice. Until now, no investor has obtained a legal land lease from the state.  
The majority of current agricultural investors has simultaneously engaged in two parallel 
routes to negotiate land access: the informal one and the formal one. These choices did not 
appear to be anchored, to rephrase von Benda-Beckmann (1981), in forum shopping 
strategies. Investors adopted the most convenient route with regard to their short term 
objectives (obtain a legal contract to convince the financial backers, start plantations to attract 
new financial backers).  
Very few operators started formal legal requests for land access upon arrival and they did so only 
only when their financial backers demanded it (banks, shareholders). Four of them started 
procedures before the 2009 crisis and  managed in about 2 years to get close to the finalization of 
of a 99-year lease but they  finally withdrew their project due to insufficient funding (NEO, Delta, 
                                                 
7
 E.g. Daniel and Mittal (2010) and World Bank (2010).  
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Delta, Unitech and GreenCO – see table in annex). The other operators have delayed or 
suspended the legal procedure due to the instability of the political context and lack of funding. 
funding. By now (2012), one third of the ongoing projects (8) have effectively started the legal 
legal procedure but they have not finalized. Hence, although some have already been in 
Madagascar for 5 years now, none of them has yet obtained a legal land lease with the state. For 
For example, in the agrodiesel sector, 28 investments were planned and 23 effectively started 
developing crops on a few hundred hectares. By now (2012), 11 are still ongoing but only one has 
has obtained a lease contract and he has established it with a private landowner ( 
 
Figure 3). Besides, legal obligations such as the conduct of the environmental impact 
assessment are not being carried out. In the agrodiesel sector, only two of them have obtained 
an environmental permit. 
In fact, quasi-all operators gave priority to local negotiations to implement a bottom-up 
approach but, above all, to carry out, without delay, trial and show-case plantations in order to 
attract new funding and to obtain extra funding to engage large-scale projects. Hence they got 
informal agreement from the local mayors or, in some case, with the regional governments – 
all these agreements being made informally and generally staying unknown form the central 
government and the central state land administration. In addition, new investors try now to 
obtain lease contract with private landowners or to employ Malagasy broker to ask land on 




To sum up, agribusiness investors in Madagascar either engage both in formal and informal 
procedures or restrict themselves to establishing informal land agreements. But, in a context 
characterised by a complex overlapping of land rights, neither of these two routes seem to 
ensure the respect of local landholders’ rights nor the effective protection of investors’ land 
rights. Aware of the complex route to get a legal land lease, investors try to delay the long 
administrative and costly procedures.  
 
IV. LEGAL PROCEDURE: COMPETITION AMONG STATE 
INSTITUTIONS FOR CONTROL OVER LAND ACCESS  
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SMOOTHING FIRST LAND ACCESS 
Central, regional and local governments as well as non-state actors generally offer a warm 
welcome to investors and help them access land in to the hope to capture material and 
symbolic resources offered by the agribusiness project. A first agreement to access land is 
easily obtained in exchange of promises of financial and material advantages.  
For land purchases and leases, state land services require that claimants obtain various 
authorisations and comply with several steps in order to verify that the targeted land is neither  
titled (whether in the name of private landowners or of the state) nor occupied. Yet, in the 6 
cases studied (e.g. Burnod et al., 2011b for more details), legal procedure allows neither the 
identification nor the respect of land rights, even of those duly recognized by positive laws.  
First fieldwork missions revealed that some of the land about to be registered in the name of 
the State for the purpose of transfers to agribusiness investors was encroaching upon: (i) non 
titled but occupied land protected by the 2005 land law; (ii) areas managed by local 
associations through legal contract legalizing their use rights (natural resources management 
contract signed by the association, the Ministry in charge of forests and the municipalities 
according to GELOSE law8) and (iii) even, titled land in the name of private land owners.  
As experts have noted, new legal regulations are not a sufficient condition to allow for the 
effective protection oflocal land rights (Vermeulen and Cotula, 2010). Low enforcement of 
land law results from technical difficulties due to large land areas. It also results from 
unawareness or wilful ignorance of law, and the fact that both land administration services 
and local land users still conceive untitled land as stated-owned. In one case, interviews with 
two local customary power-holder leaders revealed that the “consultation” procedure was 
understood as the formalisation of a decision already taken by the state and  that targeted land, 
although subject to uses, was understood to be owned by the state As such, the investor’s land 
access was impossible to circumvent or, at least, could not be opposed  in front of the state 
officials from urban centres. 
 Low enforcement of land laws results above all from the wish to see the project develop and, 
hence, from a certain commoditization of authority over land access. During legal procedure 
process, some consultations are effectively done on the field but they only involve a few 
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power-holders and officials (regional government, mayors, some village leaders and some 
local landowners).  Land services agents and those power-holders respectively ease and agree 
to the investors’ land access claims because they are respectively paid for their services (often 
on an illegal basis) or they are confident of enjoying counterparts: priority access for locals to 
jobs, construction of schools, wells or community clinics, payment of land fees - even if the 
compensation commitments are not legally binding (e.g. Cotula et al., 2010).  
CONTROLLING LAND ACCESS 
For these very reasons, the arrival of investors encourages competition among state 
institutions. If the different land laws are not strictly enforced on the fields they offer the state 
institutions grounds to claim authority over land control. In addition to the potential for rent 
(Lavigne Delville, 1998), land control is used as a vehicle to enhance the authorities' own 
visibility and influence (Sikor and Lund, 2009).  
This competition over land control appears first between the central state institutions and the 
regional/local ones. Despite initial opposition to foreign large-scale land acquisitions, the new 
regime strongly promotes the building of new economic partnerships with foreign actors. The 
Daewoo case and the large-scale land acquisition issue were therefore arguably more a case of 
political rhetoric to destabilise the former president than a definitive opposition to 
international land deals (Evers et al., 2011). Nevertheless, the new regime, conscious of the 
reluctance of the Malagasy population towards transfers of land to foreigners, also 
implemented via the Ministry of Country Planning a new circulaire designed to regulate the 
procedure for large-scale land acquisitions9. Investors are strongly encouraged to favour land 
lease over outright purchase and required to obtain an official approbation before engaging in 
procedures to access land (by a commission composed of representatives of the concerned 
ministries for projects involving more than 250 ha, by the Council of Ministers for those 
above 2 500 ha). The circulaire also reduced the lease duration down to thirty years (instead 
of 50 or 99 years) and multiplied by ten the land rents (20 000 Ariary/ha, i.e. about 
10USD/ha). 
The objective seems to be to recentralize control over these land deals and to recall the 
authority of the central administration to regional and local leaders and clerks who negotiated 
                                                 
9
 «A circulaire is a letter of instruction from the government to the administration. Circulaire 321-
10/MATD/SG/DGSF, « Instructions concernant la procédure à suivre en matière de demande de terrain de 
grande superficie », 10/25/2011”. 
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land deals without the agreement of their hierarchical superiors. Indeed, it was revealed that  
the previous central government only had information on a third of the fifty projects 
underway (our data, March 2010). The objective is also to exercise a tighter control on the 
financial resources associated to land deals. This “re-centralization” process does not fit with 
the larger process of land management decentralization induced by the land reform. It also 
goes along with the perception and practices, widespread among decision-makers and clerks 
according to which the state is still the eminent owner of most of the national territory despite 
the 2005 land laws. It then exemplified the difficulty for the central state, operating both as 
“owner” and “institution deciding who gets benefits”, to decentralize land management when 
opportunities for rent seeking by state institution – or state officials – are important (Sikor and 
Lund, 2009).  
The implementation of these new instructions forced some investors to renew the legal 
procedure they had already started (as now, there is a legal obligation to obtain permission 
from the central land administration before starting land prospection). It also forced them to 
present a business plan and to start in parallel the procedure to get an environmental permit. 
But it also lengthens the procedure and offer opportunities for some state representative to ask 
for counterparts.  
Competition within the different spheres of the state over land control is not limited to the 
relation between local, regional and central governments. Field study also revealed that it 
could divide different services within the state administration, each legitimizing their position 
on different positive laws. In the North-West of the country, the delimitation of a 20 000 ha 
area for an investor sparked a conflict between the state land services and the state Forestry 
services, the latter demanding a new delimitation to avoid the encroachment of the requested 
land on forest areas – partly managed by local association. This problem has strongly slowed 
down the investor’s land access. 
Large-scale land acquisitions have also shown to fuel tensions between regional and local 
governments. Both heads of region and the mayors can at times consider themselves as being 
in charge of the management of the territory. In two land deals, these actors have respectively 
helped different investors and made overlapping informal allocations to them (in the Northern 
part of the island, two investors (Renew and LTB investments) wanted to lease respectively 
30 000 and 20 000 hectares and they realized that their demand encroached on each other). 
These zones of disputed entitlement prove that, at the regional level, the land fitting all the 
favourable investment criteria is not as extensive as was forecasted by the regional or local 
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state representatives. This problem has also strongly slowed down the investors’ legal land 
procedures. 
SLOWING DOWN LEGAL LAND ACCESS 
Hence, the competition over control of access to land hinders the investor's land access and 
tends to increase legal procedure costs. Investors, attracted by the announced low price of the 
rents, did not properly assess all the transactions costs to access land (several appointments 
with the state’s land office, costs to obtain the formal document, funding of all state agents 
fieldwork, registration costs and bribery). Added to the funding problems that investors may 
have already been facing, these costs and obstacles, have contributed to some abandonments 
of projects. Hence the administrative procedure contributes to an informal selective process, 
pushing back the less capital-endowed investors but selecting also the ones with the stronger 
networks to overcome the administrative obstacles – criteria which differ from those seeking 
sustainable investments...  
CONTRIBUTING TO LAND INSECURITY 
Busy welcoming investors or competing for control over access to land, these various 
institutions have generally pushed local landholders’ claims into the background. In this 
competition for authority, the voices and interests of the local users appeared more as a 
pretext than as a real purpose. Land tenure insecurity does not result here from tensions 
between laws or jurisdictions but from tensions among land authorities which enforce these 
laws (e.g. Muttenzer, 2010). Some registrations of the land in the name of the state deny the 
local land rights, despite the fact that they are duly protected by state laws. Even if  investors 
withdraw their projects and do not expulse  local inhabitants, the legal registration in the name 
of the state transform former (legal) landowners into squatters.  
 
V. INFORMAL NEGOTIATION: COMPETITION OVER USE AND 
PROPERTY RIGHTS ON LAND  
A FIRST POSITIVE WELCOME 
Most investors only negotiate with what, for them, are the “most visible” institutions, i.e. 
positive law institutions (central, regional and local governments). All interviewed investors 
had introduced their project to at least one main representative of the regional government and 
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to the mayor(s) of the concerned municipality(ies). Generally, they opt – at least in a first 
phase - for the establishment of informal land contracts with those state authorities and, 
mainly, with the mayors. 
External interventions in developing countries often take the paradigmatic form of a 
‘development project’ (Bierschenk et al., 2000; Moose, 2005; Le Meur and Hochet, 2010). 
Our investigations in Madagascar seem to confirm this observation. From the interviewed 
mayors’ point of view (6 cases - NewProd, ITO, Biovision, Green-M, N-Fuel, CoCas), 
agribusiness projects are more or less similar to development projects. It is a means to 
compensate for the deficiencies of the welfare state as they hope to get, in addition to jobs 
creation, the improvement of roads, the construction of wells, schools or health centres. 
Likewise, albeit tacitly, investors who want to settle in a locality must contribute to the 
development of the area and most of those visited had established s social infrastructures even 
before the agricultural project had been properly launched (school, health centre, wells). This 
is what was explained to us by one of the interviewed mayor: 
«Why are we giving our land to project ITO? The Malagasy state doesn't even look at our 
village whereas we have lots of concrete advantages thanks to ITO. It pays land fees and 
that strongly increases the budget of my local government. Several times I asked the 
Minister: we need schools, we need hospitals. But they haven't done it. But on the contrary, 
ITO did a lot. They built a school, they are paying for a teacher, and there already are 30 
pupils. They also support a local association». A Mayor, North West Region – ITO 
investment (see table 1).  
Welcoming an agribusiness project is also a means for mayors to improve their small annual 
budget - between 5000 and 12 000 USD in average. In the ITO case, the payment of 1 USD 
per hectare on 5 000 ha has contributed to a 150% increase in the budget of the concerned 
local government.    
In the same way as brokers (e.g. Birshenk et al., 2000; Moose, 2005), the interviewed mayors 
assume the mediation between the investor's team and the local population. They organize the 
consultation with the village leaders and local populations. They often claim a genuine will to 
enhance the well-being of the local society as a whole, even if, in reality, they have a clear 
political agenda and notably, consider the pastures as less valuable than the agribusiness 
project. This position was made particularly salient in interviews with two different mayors: 
“I know that these tanety are pastures but I’d rather have 5000 jobs for all the people than 5000 
cows for few rich cattle breeders”; Mayor – ITO project (see table 1) – March 2011.  
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 “We have an opportunity for development; we cannot refuse the project just to protect pastures” 
Mayor – Quality crops (see table 1) March 2011. 
Some of them seek to find trade-offs between the investors and the different interest groups 
through compensation mechanisms such as the payment of land rents, wells, fodder in 
exchange of land use... Indeed, among those village leaders and village people consulted, 
some approved the projects without properly knowing the size and location of the targeted 
area  because they hoped to enjoy material advantages (jobs, pastures, rent). However, mayors 
did not necessarily improve communication between the developers and the local population. 
These expectations contribute to explaining the discrepancy - in a first phase - between the 
potential risks associated with large-scale land operations and the weak reactions to them (for 
a presentation of all other factors see Evers et al., 2011). 
MAINTAINING ACCESS  
The defence of land access takes different forms according to the resources at the disposal of 
local landholders’ and to the forum in which land access is negotiated (Ribot et Peluso, 2003). 
Some local land users are likely to believe that the sole alternative to defend their rights is to 
resort to violence against the investors (burning plantations) or against the institution/groups 
who have granted access to the investor.  
In the ITO case, the extension of plantations generated tensions between the investor and local 
groups and created violent divisions among local communities. Little after plantations were 
extended indeed, the area witnessed outbreaks of violence between the betsileo villages, 
settled in the locality since two generations, and sakalava10 villages, first occupants of this 
same locality. The investors had done consultations, but these had restricted to those two 
village leaders and population who lived close to the targeted land – which were Betsileo 
villages. Those leaders, as well as most of the consulted inhabitants, welcomed the company 
as they hoped that the plantations would offer a natural barrier against the sakalava's cattle 
that regularly damages their crops (Merdernach, 2012). Some were also hoping that they 
could extend their crops in the low land not used by the investors, these areas being non 
suitable for jatropha but suitable for rice. The rich investor being seen as more powerful than 
the sakalava herders using the pastures, they indeed saw his land claims as an opportunity to 
                                                 
10
 Betsileo are one socio-cultural group of Madagascar. Their historical territory is located in center part of the 
island, known for the complexity of the irrigation systems and the practice to grow rice. Lots of them migrate to 
other regions.  In the studied region, they initially came to work in the southern neighbourhood, one of the 
biggest area of irrigated rice production. Sakalava are another socio-cultural group of Madagascar. Their 
historical territory is located in the western part of the island, known for cattle breeding. 
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appropriate new lands. Moreover, they accepted the project without really being aware neither 
of the duration, nor of the size and location of the area requested by the project – as the 
developers themselves did not even really know.  
The sakalava villagers, and particularly the village heads, who considered themselves as the 
ancestral landowners, were, for their part, not consulted by the private investors. They were 
located far from the concerned tracks of land but they effectively decide over their 
management and use them as pastures. Few months after the expansion of the jatropha 
plantations on the pastures, a gang armed with guns stormed the village of the head of 
fokontany (smallest administrative unit in Madagascar), shot him off in the legs, stole the 
administrative stamp, burnt his house and those of his neighbours and killed some cows in the 
village. All the villagers suspect the Sakalava village leaders of having organized the 
operation. Stealing the administrative stamp is arguably a means of contesting the power of 
the head of fokontany, burning his house of destroying all documents relative to cattle or land 
transactions, killing rather than stealing the cattle of threatening all the villagers. Some 
assumed that it was a way to reassert their authority on land and to strongly contest the fact 
that the Betsileo villagers and their leader gave the land away to the investors. Illicit 
mechanisms, such as violence and threat, can indeed represent alternative and effective ways 
of controlling or maintaining land access (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). This violent attack, not 
directly targeted at  the investor, as he is considered  rich and able to mobilize the police or to 
resort to the justice to protect its interest, sought to remind the Betsileo that they only have use 
rights and not the full bundle of property rights.  
 
MAINTAINING LAND INSECURITY 
Tensions and conflicts can help to understand the functioning of land arenas and to identify 
who are the relevant authorities and rules from the actors’ point of view (Roberts, 1994; 
Chauveau et Mathieu, 1998; Lund, 2001). This ITO case illustrates that some of the local 
authorities who control land access can be “invisible” in the eyes of the investors and not 
really taken in account (or intentionally bypassed) by state institutions. Conflicts are then a 
mode of contesting or maintaining access to resources and of reasserting control on land 
access and, more generally, of trying to become more “visible” and to reassert their power 
(e.g. Le Meur, 2006; Ribot et Peluso, 2003 ; Sikor et Lund, 2009). To rephrase Hirschman 
analytical scheme (1970): if stakeholders cannot voice their protest in fora (voice option), 
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they can act and burn the plantations down (exit option). But in a more implicit perspective, 
these violent acts can also be, in addition to manifestations of social cleavages and diverging 
interests, modes of communication (Le Meur et al., 2006). In the ITO case, the people 
targeted were those who had negotiated with the investor and who had granted him rights – in 
disrespect of the fact that they were not the first settlers and only had secondary rights.  
These tensions and conflicts are present in several areas targeted by investors. They 
foreshadow that the investors, who are currently still negotiating land access in the local 
arena, may encounter difficulties maintaining their land access in the future even if they do 
obtain formal land lease. Property is only property if socially legitimate institutions sanction it 
(Lund, 2002). Hence, in a context of institutional and normative pluralism, investors' use 
rights sanctioned by law and state institutions are insufficient to stabilize property relations 
and confer secure land rights for investors. As stated by a herder “official document do not 
protect neither against crop destruction by cattle nor against fire” (Medernach, 2012). 
Physical fencing being costly and inefficient on such large tracks of land, the risk is that 
investors will have to resort to force (armed security staff) to maintain their rights. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Malagasy body of state rules, despite its ambiguities, does provide a regulatory 
framework for large-scale land acquisitions and for local land rights protection. Nonetheless, 
in our case studies, neither central, regional or local governments nor state services were 
enforcing the 2005 land law protecting local landholders’ rights. They all have an interest in 
claiming that the land is state owned in order to maintain their power in terms of management, 
tax perception, demand of compensation and rent-seeking. This is compounded by the fact 
that the 2005 land law is not effectively used by landholders to claim their rights. Another law 
or a code of conduct cannot be the sole way to regulate investors’ land access. Moreover, 
other means and actors are needed to favour a more effective enforcement of law.  
The entry of investors in the land arena induces legislation change (new procedure 
implemented to regulate large-scale acquisitions). It also generates tensions among 
institutions and contributes to the process of state formation. It also gives institutions 
opportunities to consolidate or enhance their authority (e.g. Sikor and Lund, 2009). But, in 
those processes of gaining access and competing over control on land access, little room is 
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left for debate and for the expression of the diverse positions of the various local landholders; 
hence, reasserting control over land is done violently.  
The issue is not only to recognize local land rights but also to take local landholders’ power 
over land control into account. Deep and long negotiation between investors, local authorities 
and local groups but also between local authorities and local groups, and among local groups 
are necessary to know if local people do accept the investment and, in that event, manage to 
evaluate the investors’ counterparts. All negotiations are influenced by asymmetrical 
information and power struggles. Nevertheless, these latter being ineluctable, these power and 
information asymmetries can be reduced through the use of legal tools and the pursuit of legal 
empowerment (certificates, local land offices, law advisers). Most of all, it requires that 
information and interactive exchange on land tenure is increased and benefits all stakeholders 
(thanks to local land offices, observatories, civil society organisations, public institutions, 
research institutes, and experts).  For sure, these negotiations can be time consuming and 
costly but they can offer the enterprise a first social recognition and avoid the expression of 
conflicts. These efforts thus need to receive political support but need also to be articulated on 
reflections on how to finance the tools and information to ease the negotiations.  
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Figure 2 : Evolution of number of investments [2005- 2012] 
Secteur  Stopped Ongoing Preparing No information Total 
Food 8 6 2 2 18 
Biofuel (jatropha) 16 8 3 1 28 
Biofuel (sugar cane)   7 - 9 2 18 
Forestry 4 1 1 - 6 
Total 35 15 15 5 70 
% 50% 21% 21% 7%  
Sources : nos données et WWF-PNUD-PAD, 2012.  
 
 
Figure 3 : Procedures engaged by investors in the biodiesel sector [2005- 2012] 













No info Prospection Total 
all projects [2005-2011] 2 5 4 7 2 3 5 28 
on going & preparation 0 3 0 4 1 0 3 11 
 







all projects [2005-2011] 1 2 
ongoing & in preparation projects 0 2 
 
Biodiesel sector  Start cultivation  No plantation 
all projects [2005-2011] 18 10 





Table 1 : List of projects analysed in this research  













Food Hopy Ongoing Asia North-West 5 000 1000 Local & export Regional Regional Gov. Unclear 
Food Qualitycrop Ongoing Europe North-West 20 000 250 Local Regional Local Gov. Ongoing 
Biofuel NewProd Ongoing Europe North-West 10 000 300 Local Private Private owner Planned 
Biofuel Alterfuel Ongoing Europe North-West 10 000 100 Local Local Local Gov. Planned 
Biofuel Biovision Ongoing Europe North 20 000 300 Local & Export Local Local Gov. Ongoing 
Biofuel N-Fuel Ongoing Europe North-West 30 000 300 Local Local Local Gov. Started  
Biofuel ITO Ongoing Europe South- East 80 000 30 ? ? Local Gov. Started 
Biofuel CoCas Ongoing Asia North-West 5 000 80 ? Regional Regional Gov. Started 
Food Daewoo Stopped Asia North 1 300 000 0 Export National None Started but stopped 
Food Varun Stopped Asia North 230 000 0 Local & export Local Associations None 
Food Pro2 Stopped Europe North 150 000 0 Export Local Only prospection - 
Food Madabeef Stopped Europe West 200 000 0 Export EDBM Only prospection - 
Biofuel Logos Stopped Europe West 30 000 10 Export Regional Local Gov. Started but stopped 
Biofuel Sun Energy Stopped Mid-East North-West 30 000 600 Export Regional Regional Gov. Started but stopped 
Biofuel Green-M Stopped Europe South -East 50 000 20 000 Export Regional Local Gov. None 
Biofuel LTB Stopped Pacific North 120 000 300 Export Local Local Gov. Started but stopped 
Food TNT Stopped Africa East ? - Export National Only prospection X 
Gov. = government 
